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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was Jury Instruction No. 48 a correct statement of Utah law on 
superseding cause? And if so, would Instruction No. 48 have been a correct 
statement of Utah law if it had instructed the jury that an intervening negligent act 
can be a superseding cause? 
2. May the plaintiffs appeal the fact that the trial court did not instruct the 
jury on negligent superseding cause when the plaintiffs were the party who objected 
to the inclusion of negligence in the instruction? 
3. Can the plaintiffs satisfy their burden to show a reasonable likelihood 
that the verdict would have been different without Instruction No. 48 despite the fact 
that the jury never even reached the issues of proximate cause and apportionment 
of fault? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 2, 2002, Aaron Gardner was unloading a truck at the Sysco 
warehouse in West Jordan, Utah when the dock leveler he was using malfunctioned 
and fell on him. Gardner sustained fatal injuries from that incident, and his family 
filed suit in an effort to recover damages. 
A subsequent investigation revealed that the dock leveler malfunctioned 
because an auxiliary contact block in the control box broke loose and allowed the 
dock plate to fall when it should have been stationary. The problem, however, was 
that no one could identify when, how or why the auxiliary contact block broke. The 
plaintiffs alleged that Defendant SPX Corporation may have manufactured an 
1 
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unreasonably dangerous dock leveler containing a broken auxiliary contact block. 
They also alleged that Hoj Engineering may have negligently broken the auxiliary i 
contact block during installation in September of 2000, more than two years before 
Gardner's accident. (See Rec. 2324 at 47.) 
I 
The defendants presented evidence that they were not liable, and they also 
presented evidence that the actions and omissions of Gardner's employer, Sysco, 
may have been a cause of the malfunction. For example, there was evidence that * 
Sysco maintenance employees could have bumped the auxiliary contact block when 
they opened the control box to perform routine maintenance such as replacing light 
bulbs on the control panel. (See Rec. 2425 at 189.) There was also evidence that 
Sysco did not train Gardner on the proper way to safely use the dock leveler. (Rec. 
2423 at 77, 115, 141-42, 156. 162.) 
And finally, there was evidence that another Sysco employee, Travis McKee, 
had a prior incident at the same dock door in which he narrowly escaped with his life. 
(Rec. 2324 at 86-88.) McKee testified he told his supervisor, Ty Pierce, about the 
incident two weeks before Gardner's death, but Sysco took no action to investigate 
or repair the defective condition that ultimately caused Gardner's fatal injuries. 
Sysco's safety manger, Ron Wood, testified at trial that there may have been a 
communication problem within Sysco's management that prevented Sysco from 
addressing the issue before Gardner's unfortunate accident. (Rec. 2423 at 170.) 
Wood also testified that Sysco did not have a failure modes and effect analysis 
2 
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procedure in place at the time of Gardner's death to look for potential safety issues 
and prevent injuries. (Rec. 2423 at 195-96.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At a hearing on the jury instructions, counsel for the plaintiffs, Mr. Gilchrist, 
argued that a subsequent intervening act had to be intentional in order to completely 
break the causal chain. (Rec. 2427 at 197.) Counsel for SPX, Mr. Savage, 
countered that negligent acts also carried the potential to break the causal 
connection between prior acts and the plaintiffs ultimate damages. See id. at 197-
200. The trial court referred to the Advisory Committee Note to MUJI Instruction 
CV210, and Mr. Savage expressed his belief that the Committee Note was an 
inaccurate statement of the law. See id. at 198. Counsel for Hoj Engineering, Mr. 
Joyce, also expressed his understanding that a negligent act can satisfy the 
elements of the superseding cause doctrine. See id. at 199-201. Based on the 
representations of plaintiffs' counsel, the trial court instructed the jury that a 
superseding cause must arise from an intentional intervening act. See id. at 201-02. 
After four days of trial, the jury retired for deliberations and answered the 
interrogatories on the Special Verdict Form finding that SPX Corporation and Hoj 
Engineering were not negligent. (Rec. 2270.) Due to its finding of no negligence, 
the jury never reached the issue of whether Hoj's actions or omissions were a 
proximate cause of the decedents' injuries. See id. Additionally, the jury never 
answered the question of whether Sysco was negligent or whether Sysco's 
negligence was a proximate cause of Gardner's injuries. See id. 
3 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
First, the Court should affirm the jury's verdict and the trial court's decision to 
instruct the jury on superseding cause because Utah law recognizes the 
superseding cause doctrine and it does not conflict with principles of comparative 
fault. 
Second, the Court should affirm the jury's verdict because any error in the 
instruction was invited error. The plaintiffs have complained that the trial court's 
instruction confused the jury because it only referred to subsequent intentional acts, 
but the plaintiffs insisted that the trial court only instruct the jury on intervening 
intentional acts rather than on intervening negligent acts. In fact, the plaintiffs took 
the position that a negligent act could not constitute a superseding cause. Having 
won the argument at trial, the plaintiffs can not now complain that the instruction 
should have advised the jury that the subsequent negligence of another party could 
be a superseding cause. 
Third, any error in the instruction was harmless because the jury never 
reached the issues of proximate cause or apportionment of fault. The jury found that 
neither Hoj Engineering nor SPX Corporation were negligent. As such, there was 
not a reasonable likelihood that a different instruction would have affected the 
outcome of the jury's deliberations. 
As to the issue of whether the court should have exercised jurisdiction over 
Schneider Electric, Hoj Engineering does not take any position except to assert that 
the outcome of that issue should not have any bearing on Hoj Engineering. 
4 
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Regardless of whether the trial court should or should not have exercised personal 
jurisdiction over Schneider Electric, the jury found that Hoj Engineering was not 
negligent and the court should affirm that verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
The Court should affirm the jury's verdict because it was supported by the 
evidence and the instructions were correct. Contrary to the plaintiffs' arguments: (I) 
superseding cause is a viable legal doctrine under Utah law; (II) the plaintiffs' appeal 
fails because the plaintiffs invited the error of omitting negligence from the 
instruction; and, (III) any error in the instruction was harmless because the jury did 
not reach the issue of proximate cause. 
I. SUPERSEDING CAUSE IS A VIABLE LEGAL DOCTRINE UNDER UTAH 
LAW 
Contrary to the plaintiffs' argument, Utah's recognition of the superseding 
cause doctrine is not contrary to the comparative fault statute. The plaintiffs 
mistakenly argue that the doctrine of superseding cause is no longer applicable 
because Utah's Liability Reform Act ("LRA"), which was enacted in 1986, adopted 
a comparative fault scheme. The plaintiffs are wrong. To support their argument, 
the plaintiffs relied on Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983), but 
the plaintiffs' reliance on that case is misplaced. First, Harris was decided before the 
enactment of the LRA. And second, the plaintiffs have misinterpreted the holding 
of Harris. 
The plaintiffs argued that Harris stands for the proposition that the 
superseding cause instruction is incompatible with comparative fault principles, but 
5 
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that is not the holding of Harris. The holding of Harris is that trial courts should only 
decide cases based on the issue of superseding cause as a matter of law when the 
facts are clear. Normally, the question of superseding cause presents factual issues 
that should be considered by the jury in apportioning fault. See id. at 222. 
In McCorvey v. UDOT, 868 P.2d 41 (Utah 1993), a case decided seven years 
after the LRA was enacted, the Utah Supreme Court approved of the trial court's use 
of a superseding cause jury instruction. Id. at 45. The McCorvey court also cited 
with approval numerous Utah cases on superseding causation including Harris v. 
UTA, 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983) and Watters v. Querrey, 626 P.2d 455 (Utah 1981). 
Id. atn. 9,10,11, & 12. 
McCorvey provided the following definition of superseding causation which 
was obtained from Harris v. UTA, 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983): "Under the law of 
superseding causation, '[a] person's negligence is not superseded by the negligence 
of another if the subsequent negligence of another is foreseeable' to the original 
actor." Id. In addition, Bansasine v. Bodell, 927 P.2d 675,677 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
states, "Utah courts have consistently recognized that 'a more recent negligent [or 
criminal/intentional] act may . . . relieve the liability of a prior negligent actor under 
the proper circumstances.'" Id. {quoting Steffensen v. Smith, 820 P.2d 482, 488 
(Utah App. 1991)). Clearly, superseding causation is a viable doctrine under the 
LRA. 
In fact, Utah courts have held that a trial court may rule as a matter of law on 
proximate cause (and thus superseding cause) if: "(1) there is no evidence to 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
establish a causal connection, this leaving causation to jury speculation, or (2) where 
reasonable persons could not differ on the inferences to be derived from the 
evidence on proximate causation." Bansasine, 927 P.2d at 676 (quoting Mitchell v. 
Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 246-47 (Utah 1985)). The Harris court expressly 
clarified that it did not mean to "imply that rulings by the trial court which decide a 
factual contention as a matter of law are never appropriate." Id. at 220. Therefore, 
where the second actor's conduct is sufficiently extraordinary so as to be 
unforeseeable, such that reasonable persons could not differ on the inferences to 
be derived, then the court may decide the issue of superseding causation as a 
matter of law. 
A. Utah Courts Have Consistently Held that the Superseding Cause 
Doctrine Is Viable in a Comparative Fault Scheme Because It 
Helps Define the Parameters of Proximate Cause 
The Utah Supreme Court recently re-confirmed the role that intervening cause 
plays in defining proximate cause when it stated that the proximate cause of an 
injury is "the event in natural and continuous sequence, (unbroken by an efficient 
intervening cause), [that] produces the injury and without which the result would not 
have occurred." Magana v. Dave Roth Constr., 2009 UT 45, fl27, 215 P.3d 143 
(Utah 2009). In other words, the Utah Supreme Court recognizes that an intervening 
cause may break the causal chain and result in a finding that a defendant is not 
legally liable for the plaintiff's injuries. Furthermore, "[p]roximate cause is a legal 
construct calling for a legal conclusion based on various factors in addition to an 
actual cause-effect relationship. It is common place in the law that an act, omission, 
7 
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or force may be an actual cause, but not a proximate cause." Bennion v. LeGrand 
Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078,1083 (Utah 1985). i 
In Magana, the plaintiff sued a construction company and a crane company 
after he was injured by a load of trusses that fell as they were being loaded off a 
i 
truck by a crane. Id. 1]1. The trusses allegedly fell because the load was negligently 
rigged. Id. 1J2. The construction company moved for summary judgment arguing 
that it was not liable under the retained control doctrine for the crane-rigging ' 
because its employee did not actively participate in the rigging process. Id. 1J14. 
The construction company further argued that, even if the employee had helped rig 
the load, the rigging was the sole responsibility of the crane company for which the 
crane company should be solely liable. Id. ^4. 
After reviewing the facts of the case, the court concluded that the rigging 
"constituted an efficient intervening cause of Magana's injuries," and that the 
construction company's conduct was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries 
under the retained control doctrine. Id fl28. The plaintiff had argued that the 
construction company's supervisor, Campbell, contributed to the accident because 
he had determined where to place the walls, where to off-load the trusses, and he 
had made the decision to hire the crane company. Id. Despite the fact that the 
accident would not have occurred in the absence of those events, the court held that 
"[e]ach of the above listed activities occurred prior to the rigging of the load of 
trusses, which rigging constituted an efficient intervening cause of Magana's 
injuries." Id. As such, the plaintiff failed in his burden to show that the conduct of the 
8 
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construction company's employee fell within "the scope of the injury-causing" events. 
Id. H28. 
That is similar to the facts of the instant case. At trial, the plaintiffs argued that 
the evidence offered the potential to find that Hoj Engineering might have possibly 
acted negligently in the installation and/or service of the dock leveler. And although 
there was no direct evidence of any negligence, the plaintiffs asked the jury to draw 
such an inference. Likewise, Hoj Engineering presented evidence that Sysco's own 
maintenance personnel had worked inside the control panel where the broken 
auxiliary contact block was found and that the dock leveler had reportedly functioned 
properly for at least two years. 
Had the jury reached the issue of proximate cause, it would have been proper 
for the jurors to consider whether Sysco's alleged negligence and/or intentional 
conduct was an efficient intervening cause of Gardner's injuries just like the court 
found that the rigging in Magana was an efficient intervening cause. The mere fact 
that Hoj Engineering participated in the installation of the dock leveler two years 
before the accident does not necessarily mean that Hoj Engineering's conduct was 
the proximate cause of Gardner's injuries. 
Like the plaintiff in Magana, the plaintiffs in this case failed to offer any 
explanation or theory as to how any of Hoj Engineering's actions related to Gardner's 
operation of the dock leveler, and accordingly, each falls outside the scope of the 
injury-causing events that gave rise to Gardner's injuries. 
9 
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B. The Court Should Not Adopt the Plaintiffs' Erroneous 
Interpretation of Utah Law 
4 
The plaintiffs have asked the Court to depart from Utah law and adopt a 
position tangentially stemming from an Advisory Committee note that is based on an 
incorrect interpretaton of Bansasine. (See App. Brief at 29.) While perhaps ' 
interesting, the MUJI 2nd Committee Notes are not law and this particular note does 
not accurately reflect the status of the law in Utah. Despite the Advisory 
i 
Committee's perception that there may be an ambiguity in the law, there is no 
ambiguity and Utah law recognizes that superseding acts may be either intentional 
or negligent. "What is well established is that for a subsequent act to break the chain 
of causation and be a superseding cause, the subsequent act must be 
unforeseeable." MUJI 2d Committee Notes (avai lable at 
http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/muji/). 
The plaintiffs' assertion that the doctrine of superseding cause only relieves 
a party of liability if the subsequent act was intentional was erroneous at trial and it 
is erroneous on appeal. The plaintiffs draw the distinction between intentional and 
negligent superseding acts by arguing that the LRA requires the jury to apportion 
negligence, but does not require apportionment of intentional acts. (See App. Brief 
at 25.) That interpretation, however, is wrong and the plaintiffs' argument fails as a 
matter of law because: (1) the comparative fault scheme does not apply when a 
superseding cause breaks the causal connection; and (2) intentional and negligent 
acts are capable of breaking the causal connection. 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1. The Comparative Fault Scheme Does Not Apply When a 
Superseding Cause Breaks the Causal Connection Because 
There is No Fault to Compare 
Contrary to the plaintiffs assertion, the LRA's focus is not on apportioning 
"negligence;" it is on apportioning "fault." The LRA requires the jury to "allocate the 
percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each person seeking recovery, to 
each defendant, to any person immune from suit, and to any other person." Utah 
Code Ann. §78B-5-818(4)(a). The LRA defines "fault" as "any actionable breach of 
legal duty, act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to injury." Utah Code 
Ann. §78B-5-817(2). 
Therefore, the proper question is not whether the subsequent intervening act 
was intentional or negligent; the proper question is whether the conduct of the first 
defendant is actionable in light of a subsequent intervening act that broke the causal 
connection by setting a new chain of events in motion. In cases where the 
intervening act breaks the causal connection, there is no actionable fault and there 
is nothing to allocate under the LRA. See Bansisine, 927 P.2d at 676 (claim failed 
as a matter of law because a subsequent act broke the causal connection); compare 
Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24,1J24, 116 P.3d 263 (Utah 2005) ("Where there is 
no duty, there is no fault to compare or distribute under the comparative fault 
scheme."); Jacobsen Constr. Co. v. Structo-Lite Eng'g, 619 P.2d 305 (Utah 1980) 
(holding that courts do not violate principles of comparative negligence when 
evaluating the presence or absence of duty under what had previously been 
denominated as primary assumption of the risk). For these reasons, the plaintiffs' 
11 
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reliance on the LRA is misplaced and the Court should reject the plaintiffs' 
reasoning. I 
•2. Intentional and Negligent Acts Are Capable of Breaking the 
Causal Connection 
The plaintiffs' arguments are also erroneous because the causal connection ' 
can be broken by either intentional or negligent acts, so long as the intervening act 
was not foreseeable. This principle can be illustrated using the facts of Bansisine 
in which the court held that a superseding act may be either negligent or intentional. 
Id. 927 P.2d at 677. In that case, the defendant "was driving northbound on 
Interstate 15 with plaintiffs father when Lucas Bodell drove up close behind them, 
blinding [the defendant] with his lights." Id. at 676. The defendant let Bodell pass 
him, but then sped up behind Bodell and also shined his high beams at Bodell. Id. 
The defendant then passed Bodell and changed lanes into the same lane in which 
Bodell was driving. Id. Not to be outdone, Bodell drove up alongside the defendant 
who then sped up. Bodell followed suit, and as he pulled next to the defendant's 
vehicle a second time, the plaintiffs father "made an obscene gesture at Bodell." In 
response, Bodell pulled out a handgun and in the course of events fired a shot that 
fatally wounded the plaintiff's father. Id. 
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant's reckless driving was a cause of his 
father's death, and the defendant moved for summary judgment. Id. Significantly, 
the defendant conceded that he owed the victim a duty, that he breached that duty, 
and that the plaintiff suffered damages. Id. The only issue raised on summary 
judgment was whether the defendant's breach was a proximate cause of the 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
plaintiff's injuries or whether Bodell's superseding act broke the causal chain 
between the defendant's recklessness and the damages. Id. 
The court began by stating that "[p]roximate cause is that cause which, in 
natural and continuous sequence, (unbroken by efficient intervening cause), 
produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred." Id. The 
court then explained that the issue in the case was whether it was foreseeable that 
reckless driving would likely result in another driver shooting a bullet into the vehicle. 
See id. The plaintiff argued that the "defendant should have been able to foresee 
that if he drove recklessly and rudely, someone might fire a weapon into his car, 
injuring his passenger," but the court disagreed. Id. at 676-77. 
Although we recognize that many aspects of today's society are 
becoming more violent and confrontational, we cannot conclude that a 
gunshot is within the scope of the risk created by defendant's rude and 
reckless driving. . . As previously stated, defendant could not have 
foreseen this result, and thus, his reckless driving could not have been 
the proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries. 
Id. 
Stated differently, the shooter's intervening act rendered the defendant's 
reckless driving in-actionable because there was no proximate cause. The 
interesting thing about Bansisine is that it would not have mattered whether Bodell 
intentionally discharged the gun or whether he negligently discharged the gun. 
Neither event would have been foreseeable, and either event would have broken the 
causal chain. In fact, the Bansisine court affirmed that negligent superseding acts 
can break the causal connection when it wrote that "Utah courts have consistently 
recognized that more recent negligent [or criminal/intentional] act may . . . relieve 
13 
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the liability of a prior negligent actor under the proper circumstances." Id. 
(punctuation in original, but emphasis added); see also Restat. (2nd) of Torts § 447 
(cited with approval in McCorvey v. UDOT, 868 P.2d 41 (Utah 1993)). 
The approach taken by the Utah courts is superior to the approach suggested 
in Barry and the other cases cited by the plaintiffs because Utah's superseding 
cause doctrine provides a simple explanation of the issues and outlines the essential 
elements that the jury may consider. One of the problems with the plaintiffs' 
proposed approach is that it would create a different definition of proximate cause 
in negligence cases than that which would be employed in intentional act cases or 
criminal cases. See e.g., Herrera v. Quality Pontiac, 73 P.3d 181,192 (N.M. 2003) 
(overruling Torres v. El Paso Bee. Co., 987 P.2d 386 (N.M. 1999) because the rule 
it announced in comparative negligence cases could not be applied in cases 
involving criminal acts). 
There is no reason to employ different definitions of proximate cause 
depending on the mental status of the liable party. An act is either a proximate 
cause of an injury or it is not. The superseding cause doctrine helps to define the 
outer parameters of proximate cause and its reliance on principles of foreseeability 
and remoteness make it applicable in all types of cases. 
The plaintiffs' proposed approach, by contrast, would be difficult to apply in a 
predictable manner. That has, in fact, occurred in the New Mexico courts who 
decided in Torres to not allow superseding cause in comparative negligence cases, 
but then had to overrule that case in Herrera because Herrera involved a 
14 
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foreseeable criminal act. Then last year, the New Mexico Court of Appeals had to 
distinguish Herrera in a case involving a sexual assault when it granted summary 
judgment to the owner of the property where the assault occurred. Newbury v. 
Moody, 2009 N.M. App. Unpub. LEXIS 477 (N.M. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2009) 
(unpublished decision, Addendum). The plaintiff in Newbury argued that Herrera 
should apply because it also involved a subsequent criminal act, but the Newbury 
court disagreed on the basis that the criminal act in Herrera was foreseeable, 
whereas the criminal act in Newbury was not foreseeable. Id. 
Under Utah's superseding cause doctrine, by contrast, it is not necessary to 
create artificial and meaningless distinctions like the New Mexico courts have done. 
The superseding cause doctrine is premised on foreseeability and it provides a 
concise framework that can be used to help define proximate cause in all types of 
claims. By continuing to employ the superseding cause doctrine, the Utah courts are 
promoting consistent, understandable and predictable verdicts. 
For these reasons, the Court should affirm the jury's verdict and reject the 
plaintiffs' request to abandon the superseding cause doctrine. 
II. THE PLAINTIFFS' APPEAL FAILS BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFFS INVITED 
THE ERROR OF OMITTING NEGLIGENCE FROM THE INSTRUCTION 
The Court should also reject the plaintiffs' appeal because any error in 
Instruction No. 48 was invited by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have argued that the 
trial court committed an error because the Special Verdict Form only asked the jury 
to answer whether Sysco was negligent, but the superseding cause instruction told 
the jury a superseding cause must be an intentional act. However, to the extent 
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that constitutes an error, it is not appealable because it was invited by the plaintiffs. 
See Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37,1J12,163 P.3d 615 (Utah 2007) 
("The invited error doctrine prevents a party from taking advantage of an error 
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error."). 
Based on the plaintiffs' objection, the Court instructed the jury that a 
superseding cause must stem from an intentional act, but the instruction would have 
been equally or more accurate if it had instructed the jury about a subsequent 
negligent act. (See Rec. at 2427,190-204.) At the time of trial, plaintiffs' counsel 
argued that the superseding cause instruction must inform the jury that, for the 
defendants to escape liability, the subsequent act must have been intentional. See 
id. That is an erroneous statement of the law, but the Court overruled the 
defendants' objections and instructed the jury as requested by the plaintiffs. In other 
words, if there was an error in the instruction, the plaintiffs invited the error and it 
may not serve as the basis for reversal. 
III. ANY ERROR IN THE INSTRUCTION WAS HARMLESS BECAUSE THE 
JURY DID NOT REACH THE ISSUE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 
The Court should also affirm the jury's verdict because any alleged error in the 
superseding cause instruction was harmless. "Harmless errors are those that are 
sufficiently inconsequential so no reasonable likelihood exists that the error affected 
the outcome of the proceedings." C. T. by & ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, 
TJ18, 977 P.2d 479 (Utah 1999) (finding that the court's failure to instruct the jury on 
all of the factors in a punitive damages case was harmless because the jury likely 
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considered the relevant factors despite the lack of an instruction). The Utah 
Supreme has observed that 
[n]o trial is perfect, and in many proceedings there is some technical 
error. However, to reverse a trial verdict, this court must find not a mere 
possibility, but a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the result. 
Even if the instruction had been worded correctly, there is no 
reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been more favorable 
to [the plaintiff]. 
Steffensen, 862 P.2d at 1347. 
In this case, the plaintiff has acknowledged that "[i]t is impossible to determine 
if the jury made its determination that SPX and HOJ were not at fault as a result of 
a superceding [sic] cause." (App. Brief at 29.) That argument falls far short of 
establishing a reasonable likelihood that the alleged error resulted in a less favorable 
verdict for the plaintiffs. In fact, the plaintiffs have not set forth any facts or argument 
upon which the Court could rely to conclude that the verdict would have been more 
favorable to the plaintiffs in the absence of Instruction No. 48. As such, the plaintiffs 
have failed to establish a reversible error. 
The possibility that the instruction affected the jury's verdict is not sufficient to 
reverse the jury's verdict. It is important to note that the jury never even considered 
the issues of proximate cause or apportionment of fault. Because the jury decided 
the case on negligence, not on proximate cause, any argument that a different 
superseding cause instruction would have affected the outcome is speculative and 
conjectural. 
Utah law recognizes that "[i]n every case, negligence and proximate cause are 
separate and distinct factors in assigning tort liability. Proof of negligence is never 
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enough by itself to establish liability; it must also be proved that negligence was a 
cause of the event which produced the injury." Holmstrom v. C.R. England, Inc., 
2000 UT App 239, P 32, 8 P.3d 281 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (quotations and citations 
omitted). In this case, the jury's verdict was that neither Hoj nor SPX were negligent. 
As such, the jury never responded the interrogatories regarding proximate cause, 
Sysco's negligence, or the apportionment of fault between the parties. Because the 
superseding cause instruction dealt with proximate cause and apportionment of fault, 
it was not a factor in the jury's determination. 
The plaintiffs have relied on Barry v. Quality Steel Prods., 820 A.2d 258 
(Conn. 2003) to argue that superseding cause is confusing to juries. However, the 
problem in Barry was different than the alleged problem in this case. In Barry, the 
issue was not whether a jury instruction was correct. The issue was whether it was 
proper to include an interrogatory on the verdict form that cut off the product 
manufacturer's liability. 
At the close of the Barry trial, the jury was asked to determine whether the 
roof brackets were unreasonably dangerous and whether that defective condition 
was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries. Id. The jury was also asked to 
determine whether the negligence of the injured plaintiffs (who had installed the roof 
brackets) was an intervening cause of the accident that cut off the liability of the 
manufacturer. Id. at 262-63. The jury found that the roof brackets were 
unreasonably dangerous and that the manufacturing defect was a proximate cause 
of the injuries. Id. at 262. However, the jury also found that the negligence of the 
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injured workers was a superseding cause and they awarded the plaintiffs nothing. 
Id. 
Based on the facts of that case, the Barry court decided it was unfair to ask 
the jury to whether the defendants could completely escape liability based on a 
superseding cause instruction. Instead, the Barry court decided to couch 
superseding cause in terms of a proximate cause instruction, and then ask the jury 
to determine the liability of the parties and apportion fault. Id. at 267. 
That is precisely what happened in the instant case. Unlike the verdict form 
in Barry, the Special Verdict Form in this case did not ask the jury to decide if 
Sysco's negligence completely cut off the defendants' liability. Instead, the Special 
Verdict Form asked the jury to decide whether the parties were negligent and 
whether their negligence was a proximate cause of Gardner's injuries. (Rec. at 
2269-71.) If the jury had responded affirmatively, it would have then been asked to 
apportion fault between all of the liable parties. At that point, the jury could have 
allowed the defendants to escape liability by apportioning 100% of the fault to Sysco 
and/or Gardner, but the jury never answered that question because it decided that 
neither Hoj nor SPX were negligent. Accordingly, the reasoning of the Barry court 
is not applicable, and the court should affirm the jury's verdict. 
Moreover, the trial may have committed reversible error if it had refused to 
instruct the jury on superseding cause because that was one of the defendants' 
theories of the case. "Where there is evidence adduced to support a party's theory 
of the case, it is prejudicial error for the trial court to fail to instruct thereon." Watters 
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v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455, 458-459 (Utah 1981). At trial, the defendants adduced 
evidence that the dock leveler functioned perfectly for a significant period of time < 
after its installation. There was also evidence from which the jury could have 
concluded that Sysco personnel had worked inside the control box where the broken 
auxiliary contact block was found. The defendants also adduced evidence that 
Travis McKee, one of Gardner's co-employees, experienced the same type of 
malfunction with the dock leveler just two weeks before Gardner's accident, but i 
Sysco took no action to lock out the dock leveler or prevent other employees from 
using it until it was repaired. 
The plaintiff may argue about the strength of that evidence, but it was certainly 
sufficient to put the issue of superseding cause before the jury. As such, the trial 
court was correct in giving an instruction on superseding cause. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should affirm the jury's verdict because the trial court was correct 
to instruct the jury on the issue of superseding cause. Additionally, the plaintiffs may 
not complain that Instruction No. 48 required evidence of an intentional act because 
that was invited error. To the extent that the instruction should have included 
reference to negligent acts, there was no harm to the plaintiffs because the jury 
never reached the issues of proximate cause or apportionment of fault. 
At trial, the plaintiffs had their opportunity to present evidence in support of 
their allegation that Hoj may have been negligent. The jury weighed the evidence 
and concluded that it did not support the plaintiffs' contention. As such, the Court 
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should not reverse or remand the case for a new trial. Even if the Court were to find 
that the trial court erred in not exercising personal jurisdiction against Schneider 
Electric, the jury's verdict in favor of Hoj Engineering should be affirmed. 
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OPINION 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
WECHSLER, Judge. 
Plaintiff appeals an order of summary judgment 
granted in favor of Defendant Sam Valencia and staying 
proceedings against Defendant Tom Moody pending the 
outcome of this appeal. [RP 535] We proposed to affirm 
in a notice of proposed summary disposition. Valencia 
filed a timely memorandum in support, and Plaintiff filed 
a timely memorandum in opposition. Remaining 
unpersuaded by Plaintiffs memorandum, we affirm the 
order granting summary judgment to Valencia. 
"Summary judgment is appropriate where there are 
no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Self v. United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., 1998 NMSC 46, P6, 126 KM. 396, 
970 P.2d 582; accord Rule 1-G56(C) NMRA. "The 
movant need only make a prima facie showing that he is 
entitled to summary judgment. [*2] Upon the movant 
making a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the 
party opposing the motion to demonstrate the existence 
of specific evidentiary facts which would require trial on 
the merits." Roth v. Thompson, 113 KM. 331, 334-35, 
825 P.2d 1241, 1244-45 (1992) (citation omitted); see 
Ciup v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 1996 KMSC 62, P7, 122 
KM. 537, 928 P.2d 263 (stating that once the movant 
makes a prima facie case, the burden "shifts to the 
opponent to show at least a reasonable doubt, rather than 
a slight doubt, as to the existence of a genuine issue of 
fact"). We review the grant of a motion for summary 
judgment de novo. See Self, 1998 KMSC 46, P 6. 
The Alleged Sexual Assault Was Not Foreseeable 
In our notice of proposed summary disposition, we 
proposed to hold that Valencia could not be liable for the 
alleged sexual assault committed by Moody because the 
assault was not foreseeable. Cf Romero v. Giant Stop-K-
Go of KM., Inc., 2009 KMCA 59, P7, 146 KM. 520, 146 
KM. 520, 212 P. 3d 408 (observing that even though a 
business owner has a duty to protect customers from 
harm caused by the criminal actions of a third person, 
this duty extends only to conduct and any resultant harm 
that was foreseeable), [*3] cert, denied, 2009 KMCERT 
005, 146 KM. 728, 214 P. 3d 793. In our previous notice, 
we reviewed the materials submitted by Valencia in 
support of his motion for summary judgment. Valencia 
submitted his own affidavit and portions of the 
deposition of Plaintiff and her companion showing that 
Plaintiff willingly entered the bedroom with Moody, 
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Plaintiff willingly consumed significant quantities of 
alcohol both before and after arriving at Valencia's 
residence, Plaintiff willingly ingested Valium offered by 
Moody, and Plaintiff and Moody willingly consumed 
some quantity of cocaine offered by Valencia. [RP 146, 
151, 156, 160, 164-167] Valencia also submitted sworn 
testimony establishing that he had no reason to know of 
any violent tendencies by Moody and no reason to know 
that Moody presented any danger to Plaintiff or that 
Plaintiff ever felt frightened while in Moody's company. 
[RP 141, 148, 163, 164-167] 
Based upon these submissions, we proposed to hold 
that Valencia established a prima facie case that Moody's 
actions in allegedly sexually assaulting Plaintiff were not 
foreseeable because there was no evidence that Valencia 
either knew or should have known that Moody posed a 
risk of harm [*4] or that Valencia needed to control 
Moody's activities. [RP 120-139; DS 4] Therefore, 
Valencia established that he could not be liable for any 
alleged negligence in failing to protect Plaintiff from 
Moody's actions or the resulting injury. Cf. Herrera v. 
Quality Pontiac, 2003 NMSC 18, P21, 134 NM. 43, 73 
P. 3d 181 (observing that a duty may arise if the 
defendant realized or should have realized that his or her 
conduct "created a situation in which a third person 
might avail himself or herself of the opportunity to 
commit criminal acts" such that the defendant could be 
said to have created or increased a risk of harm through 
the criminal conduct); Sarracino v. Martinez, 117 N.M. 
193, 195-96, 870 P.2d 155, 157-58 (Ct. App. 1994) 
("[T]he criminal acts of a third person will not relieve a 
negligent defendant of liability if the defendant should 
have recognized that his or her actions were likely to lead 
to that criminal activity."). It was then Plaintiffs burden 
to establish facts necessitating a trial. See Roth, 113 N.M. 
at 334-35, 825 P.2d at 1244-45. 
In response, Plaintiff claimed that because Valencia 
supplied the cocaine and alcohol to invitees in his home 
with the intent to have [*5] an "orgy," there was a 
foreseeable risk that additional criminal activity, 
including sexual assault, would occur, and Valencia is 
therefore liable for the resultant harm. [DS 4-5; RP 434] 
She further argued that Valencia acknowledged the 
foreseeability of Moody's criminal action and ratified it 
by dissuading Plaintiff from reporting the alleged sexual 
assault because drugs were involved. [DS 5; RP 425] We 
proposed to hold that these submissions failed to rebut 
Valencia's prima facie case showing that Plaintiffs injury 
was not foreseeable. See Herrera, 2003 NMSC 18, P 20 
(observing that, "no one is bound to guard against or take 
measures to avert that which he [or she] would not 
reasonably anticipate as likely to happen" (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); 
see Johnstone v. City of Albuquerque, 2006 NMCA 119, 
P 8, 140 N.M. 596, 145 P.3d 76 (noting that a defendant 
can only be liable for harm that he could "objectively and 
reasonably expect, not merely what might conceivably 
occur" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
In proposing to hold that Plaintiff had failed to 
establish that Valencia could objectively and reasonably 
expect that [*6] Moody might sexually assault Plaintiff, 
we observed that there was no evidence that Valencia 
had any indication that Moody might be violent or might 
commit a sexual assault. We also observed that Plaintiff 
failed to provide any testimony or evidence tying the use 
of cocaine to violence. Cf. Romero, 2009 NMCA 59, PP 
10-11 (observing that the plaintiff submitted police logs 
and deposition testimony showing "prior reports of theft 
of gasoline and alcohol, physical altercations involving 
loiterers, domestic violence, harassment, traffic 
accidents, vandalism, trespassing, suspicious persons,.. . 
wild and stray animals at the service station[, and] 
commercial robberies and incidents involving narcotics" 
but also observing that there was "no evidence of 
anything remotely similar to the deliberate, targeted 
shootings in this case" and therefore holding that "the 
type of crime which is at issue in this case, specifically, a 
sudden, deliberate and targeted shooting, is [not] 
sufficiently commonplace that business proprietors 
should be categorically required to foresee such 
occurrences"). 
In her memorandum in opposition, Plaintiff cites to 
numerous law review articles and other publications [*7] 
that allegedly tie the use of cocaine and alcohol to 
various types of violent or criminal behavior and indicate 
that Plaintiff could not be expected to make reasonable 
decisions. [MIO 12-17] However, none of this material 
was before the district court and none of it is part of the 
record. Therefore, we will not consider this material in 
determining whether Plaintiff rebutted Valencia's prima 
facie case. See Largo v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. 
Co., 2002 NMCA 21, P33, 131 N.M. 621, 41 P.3d 347 
(filed 2001) (refusing to consider exhibits that were 
attached to the defendant's answer brief that were not 
before the district court until after the motion for 
summary judgment was granted because "[m]atters not of 
record are not considered on appeal"). 
In the absence of any information tying the use of 
cocaine and alcohol to the likelihood of sexual assault, 
we remain unconvinced that Plaintiff rebutted Valencia's 
prima facie case establishing that he did not have a duty 
to prevent the alleged sexual assault because the assault 
was not foreseeable as a matter of law. In addition, 
Plaintiffs attempt to rely on cases where the harmful 
result was foreseeable is unavailing because in those 
[*8] cases there was evidence introduced at the district 
court level establishing that the harm that resulted was 
actually foreseeable. [MIO 18-24] See, e.g., Reichert v. 
Atler, 117 N.M. 623, 624-27, 875 P.2d 379, 380-83 
(1994) (recognizing that a bar owner may be liable for 
failing to protect a patron from a foreseeable assault from 
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another patron and also recognizing that the shooting was 
foreseeable because: (1) the victim had previously told 
the bar owner's representative that the perpetrator had a 
history of violence, carried a gun, and had previously 
killed someone; and (2) the bar had a reputation as being 
very dangerous and had been the site of numerous 
shootings, stabbings, and assaults). 
For example, Plaintiff cites to Herrera to support her 
contention that Valencia must be responsible because he 
created a situation that allowed the sexual assault to 
occur. [MIO 23-24, 26-27] However, in that case there 
was evidence to support a finding of foreseeability. In 
Herrera, our Supreme Court held that the theft of a car 
and resulting accident were foreseeable results of the 
defendant's actions in leaving the car unattended and 
unlocked with the keys in the ignition. 2003 NMSC 18, 
PP 23, 24, [*9] Moreover, in Herrera, the plaintiff had 
introduced evidence in the district court establishing the 
foreseeability of the harm, including an affidavit from a 
sociologist alleging that Albuquerque has the second 
highest rate of car thefts in the nation, that cars that are 
unlocked with the keys in the ignition are more likely to 
be stolen, and that stolen vehicles are more likely to be 
involved in accidents. Id. PP 3, 23-24. In addition, the 
sociologist relied on studies showing that "the accident 
rate for stolen cars [to be] approximately 200 times the 
accident rate for cars that have not been stolen". Id. P 3 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Plaintiff also contends that Valencia knew the 
alleged sexual assault was foreseeable because he 
dissuaded her from reporting the alleged sexual assault to 
the authorities because drugs were involved and Valencia 
did not seem interested in what Plaintiff was telling him. 
[MIO 27-28] We fail to see how a verbal attempt to 
dissuade Plaintiff from reporting the alleged sexual 
assault based on the fact that all of the participants had 
used illegal drugs is indicative of any kind of advance 
knowledge that the sexual assault [*10] was more likely 
to occur because the parties were using drugs. 
Finally, we our unpersuaded by Plaintiffs citation to 
out-of-state authority [MIO 28-29] because those cases, 
similar to New Mexico precedent, only stand for the 
proposition that an owner or proprietor has a duty to 
protect against crimes committed, or harm caused, by 
other persons when the crime or harm was foreseeable. 
To summarize, Valencia made a prima facie showing that 
he could not be liable for negligence because he could 
not foresee the criminal assault allegedly committed by 
Moody. Plaintiff failed to rebut Valencia's prima facie 
case because she failed to make a showing to the district 
court that Valencia was aware or should have been aware 
that Moody might commit a sexual assault. Cf Chavez v. 
Torres, 1999 NMCA 133, PP 23-25, 128 KM. 171, 991 
P. 2d 1 (recognizing that when the homeowner, the 
mother of the assailant, had direct knowledge that the 
assailant was a threat to his girlfriend who was in the 
home, the question of the homeowner's liability would 
have presented an issue of fact but for the fact that the 
homeowner was away from home at the time of the 
assault). Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to cite [*11] to 
any case in which a court has concluded that a 
homeowner's act of supplying adult invitees with an 
illegal substance imposes a duty on that homeowner to 
prevent a sexual assault by one invitee on another. See 
Romero, 2009 NMCA 59, P 12 (recognizing that the 
plaintiffs failed to alert the Court "to any case in which a 
court concluded that a business operator had a duty to 
prevent [the type of harm that occurred in that case:] a 
sudden, deliberately targeted assassination of customers 
on its premises"). 
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the 
district court correctly granted summary judgment in 
favor of Valencia on Plaintiffs claims that Valencia was 
responsible for the harm caused by Moody's actions in 
allegedly sexually assaulting her. 
Assault and Battery 
Plaintiff also contends that the trial court erred in 
determining that Valencia did not assault and batter her 
given the facts presented to the court on Valencia's 
summary judgment motion. [MIO 30-31; DS 5] She 
contends that Valencia's unwelcome kiss amounts to 
assault and battery even if she was "confused" at the time 
of her deposition as to whether Valencia assaulted or 
battered her. [MIO 30] We disagree. 
At the time of [*12] her deposition, although 
Plaintiff admitted that Valencia kissed her, she made no 
claims about being in fear and expressly stated that he 
did not assault or batter her. [RP 159; DS 5] Moreover, at 
the time of her deposition, she stated that the kiss ended 
as soon as she indicated her resistance. [RP 159,497] We 
are unconvinced that Plaintiffs later attempt to turn an 
unwelcome but non-threatening kiss into assault and 
battery in contradiction of her earlier sworn testimony is 
sufficient to establish a material issue of fact precluding 
summary judgment. See Rivera v. Trujillo, 1999 NMCA 
129, P 12, 128 NM 106, 990 P.2d 219 (holding that 
"post-hoc efforts to nullify unambiguous admissions 
under oath will not create a factual dispute sufficient to 
evade summary judgment"). 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons as well as those set forth 
in our notice of proposed disposition, we affirm the order 
granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant Sam 
Valencia. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 
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